Plant Sentience

Occasionally, vegans encounter the claim that plants are sentient as a kind of objection to going vegan. The uninformed reasoning suggests that since ‘all life’ is sentient, it doesn’t matter what we eat. Vegans have three replies to this: 1) accept the premise that plants are sentient (no matter how offensive to common sense it is) and argue from there; 2) deny that plants are sentient; or 3) reply with both 1) and 2), as I intend to do here.

First Reply: Plants Are Sentient; Therefore, Go Vegan

Let’s put science and common sense on hold for a couple of minutes and assume for argument’s sake that plants are sentient. Not only that, but let’s take it all the way to absurdity and assume that plants are the most sentient life on Earth.

Even if it’s true that plants are the most sentient life on Earth, veganism would still be the minimum standard of decency. This follows from the simple fact that animals are reverse protein factories, consuming multiple times the protein in plant food that they produce in protein from their flesh and bodily fluids. Cows consume from 9 to 13 times, and pigs 5 to 7 times, the protein they produce, depending on diet and confinement factors. Chickens consume 2 to 4 times the protein they produce, also depending on diet and confinement factors. So the more we’re concerned about the ‘sentience’ of plants, the less we want to contribute to the staggering inefficiencies of cycling plants through animals, and the more reason we have to go vegan to reduce both animal and plant ‘suffering’.

Second Reply: Plants Aren’t Sentient; Therefore, Go Vegan

Let’s now examine the idea that plants are sentient and see why people might believe, contrary to common sense, that plants are sentient, and where they might go wrong.

Equivocation on Sentience

To start with, let’s look at the meaning of the word sentience, because equivocation on the meaning of sentience is often a source of confusion. The definition of sentience in standard usage is an organism’s capacity to experience sensations and emotions. A non-standard definition of sentience, introduced by Robert A. Freitas Jr., and used in the so-called “sentience quotient” (SQ), is the relationship between the estimated information processing rate (measured in bits per second) of each individual processing unit, the weight or size of a single unit, and the total number of processing units. [1]

When a claim is made that plants are ‘sentient’, it is helpful to ask in what sense the claim is being made. Under the SQ definition, plants are ‘sentient’ in that they have an (extremely low) SQ value, but this low SQ value says nothing about sentience under the standard definition. Consciousness sufficient to support experiential sentience almost certainly requires a sufficiently high SQ value in addition to other neuronal properties, neither of which, for example, do computers and plants possess. [2]

Computers have an SQ value that is several orders of magnitude higher than all plants; and animals, including humans, have an SQ value that is up to several orders of magnitude higher than all computers. If computers can’t experience sensations and emotions, then it is almost certainly impossible that plants can, given plants’ extremely low SQ value and a non-neuronal information processing system. As such, it is unreasonable to believe that plants are sentient under the standard (non-SQ) definition.

Plants Are Complex

Another source of confusion regarding plants that leads some people to speculate that they are sentient is that plants are highly evolved and complex organisms that ‘react’ to their environment in surprising ways, especially in larger time scales than we perceive in everyday life. Some plants ‘react’ to insects by releasing deterrent or poisonous chemicals. Some plants release chemicals to deter other plants from growing near them. Some plants are either aggressive or passive in root development depending on whether or not they are around their own species. The Venus Flytrap catches and consumes insects when insects come in contact with tiny hairs that trigger the trap to close.

The confusion arises when the assumption is made that such plant ‘behavior’ is caused by the plants “subjectively experiencing the world through sense data” rather than by insentient hormonal, electrical, mechanical, and chemical processes.

The scientific principle of parsimony strongly suggests that we shouldn’t postulate a complex explanation for phenomena when a simpler explanation will suffice. When autonomic systems in mammals, such as the cardiovascular system, the immune system, and the reproductive system at the level of the ‘behavior’ of sperm in the presence of an egg appear to be reacting ‘subjectively, consciously and intentionally’ to perpetuate either themselves or their host organism, we don’t assume that these systems are sentient independently of their host organism and acting volitionally. We recognize that there are insentient hormonal, electrical, mechanical, and chemical processes that cause various ‘behaviors’ and events to take place. The development of these insentient processes can be explained by tens and hundreds of thousands of years of natural selection, where hundreds of billions of small, genetic mutations and combinations survived or failed to survive based on how adaptive they were. We should apply the principle of parsimony in our assessment of the causes of plant ‘behavior’ similarly.

Sentience and Neurobiology

Neuroscientists have positively confirmed the areas of our neurology (brain stem, limbic system, etc) that serve to provide sentience and complex emotion. All vertebrates and at least some non-vertebrate animals have these nervous system components, providing strong positive, empirical evidence that such beings are sentient, and that most of them have highly subjective, emotional lives. Plants do not have any of these neurological components.

Back to Common Sense

Organisms such as humans, dogs, chickens, pigs, cows, goats, and sheep look, behave, and move in ways that highly suggest sentience defined as the experience of sensation and emotion. Organisms such as plants look, behave, and stay still (unless the wind is blowing) in ways that highly suggest absolutely no sentience (again, defined as the experience of sensation and emotion). Absent an excellent reason to reject such strong appearances we ought to accept them.

If there is any room for debate and legitimate questions on sentience, it is in the biological continuum between insects and bacteria. Insects such as spiders certainly behave and move in a manner that highly suggests at least some degree of experiential sentience. How much sentience comes in degrees, and how sentient certain organisms like spiders are, are difficult questions. But we know beyond any reasonable doubt that vertebrates are sentient; and we know with a very high degree of confidence that plants are not sentient.

Conclusion

As unconscious entities, plants have no subjective, conscious interest that would be morally relevant to whether we kill them for food or other sufficient reasons (e.g. removing/killing them to build a shelter). We should respect plants in the same sense in which we respect the beauty, complexity, and wonder of insentient nature and natural phenomena in general, which entails reducing our impact on them as much as is reasonable, and not destroying them gratuitously. Our moral obligations regarding plants, however, do not compare in kind to our direct moral obligations to vertebrates, whose sentience and conscious, intentional striving for life and survival is obvious to us. Given this eager striving for life and survival of sentient vertebrates, veganism is the minimum standard of decency.

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Notes:

[1] The SQ spectrum ranges from -70 to about +50 and is computed by the formula SQ=log10(I/M), where I is measured in bits/second and M is the mass of the entire processing unit. An SQ of -70 is computed by dividing one bit by the age of the Universe in seconds (10E18 seconds), and dividing that result by the mass of the Universe (10E52 kg). The upper limit of +50 is imposed by the laws of quantum mechanics (see the link to the article below for more information).

Humans have an SQ of +13. The mass of a human neuron is about 10E-10 kg and one neuron can process 1000-3000 bit/s, resulting in +13. Nonhuman animals, from insects to mammals, are said to range from +9 to +13. Computers range from +6 to +9. Plants are said to range from -2 to +1 (the Venus Fly Trap being +1). It is important to note that these are logarithmic values, so that a difference of 5 points is 5 orders of magnitude (i.e. vastly) different.

It should be noted that SQ does not equal sentience under the standard definition of sentience. It’s possible, and even likely, that certain non-human beings could be far more sensitive to certain pain (especially in certain body parts) than humans are, even though they have a lower average SQ. SQ measures only informational processing efficiency, not pain sensitivity, which is dependent on many more factors. We need a sufficiently high SQ to feel pain, which all vertebrates have, but once that high SQ is reached, the other factors affecting pain sensitivity (such as number and sensitivity of nerve endings in certain body areas, etc) have as much or substantially more influence. In some ways, many non-human beings may be far more sensitive to physical and psychological pain than humans are, and that’s one more thing that makes what we do to sentient non-humans so tragic.

The information on SQ came from this article, and if you are interested, there is much more elaboration on SQ in it. Most of the factual details in the above calculations are not source-referenced in the article; however, I did verify the magnitude of the age of the Universe in seconds (quick calculation based on the estimated age of the Universe being about 13.7 billion years) and the mass of the Universe. I also verified the calculations of stated SQ values given the facts presented.

If anyone has good source-references on other facts (or corrections of such facts) presented here regarding SQ (such as the average mass of a human neuron), I’d be glad to update this brief essay with them.

[2] Plants process information via hormones, not neurons. Computers process information via integrated electronic circuitry in semiconductors. Neither hormones nor integrated circuits are known to be capable of producing a subjective experience of sensations. When computer touch screens are activated, for example, the ‘behavior’ of the computer results from programs being objectively and unconsciously carried out via the integrated circuits on the semiconductor devices. The computer is not ‘subjectively aware’ of anything.

On the Environmental Disaster of Animal Agriculture

During the past month, there have been a series of excellent and informative articles on the environmental disaster of animal agriculture written by Angel Flinn on Care2. I strongly urge everyone to read these articles and use them as educational tools in the fight to abolish the most deplorable industry in the world.

The most recent of Angel's articles on Care2 is about the recent Swine Flu outbreak entitled: The Flu Lagoon: A Disaster Waiting to Happen. There is a comment section if you would like to express your thoughts.

Prior to the article noted above, Angel recently wrote the following informative articles:

On the ecological benefits of veganism:

The Vegan Solution: An Ideal Whose Time Has Come

On the ecological and moral problems of free range animal agriculture:

Free Range Is Not the Answer

On how animal agriculture, specifically the chicken and egg industry, is the soy monoculture industry’s biggest customer. Indeed, the soy industry has come out against the vegan movement because their largest customer, by far, is animal agriculture.

As We Soy, So Shall We Reap

These articles are very informative and well-written. I cannot recommend them enough for both reading and sharing with others.

Food Miles Versus Food Choices

One notion brought up in the comment section of the Free Range article (linked above) was the impact of food miles. While it is usually beneficial and important to buy locally and reduce “food miles”, the benefit of buying local is often grossly exaggerated when compared to the benefits of vegan food choices. Here is a peer-reviewed study on Food Miles versus Food Choices by two engineers, Christopher L. Weber and H. Scott Matthews, at Carnegie Mellon University. The study was funded by an EPA Science to Achieve Results Fellowship and a National Science Foundation MUSES grant (see bottom of link).

I’ll leave it to the reader to pour over the link’s technical details to their heart’s desire and cut to the chase: a direct quote at the end of the first paragraph of the Relevance of Results section as follows:

“Shifting less than 1 day per week’s (i.e. 1/7 of total calories) consumption of red meat and/or dairy to other protein sources or a vegetable-based diet could have the same climate impact as buying all household food from local providers.”

So, we see that the impact of going from a diet of red meat and dairy to a vegan diet seven days a week is seven times BETTER than buying all food from local providers.

Transportation accounts for only 11% of total life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while food production (in which red meat and dairy are extremely intensive compared to plant-based food) accounts for 83% of total life-cycle GHG emissions.

The study mentions chicken and fish as alternatives to plant protein, but the chicken industry is the soy-monoculture industry’s biggest customers and chickens are reverse protein factories by a 2:1 ratio. Also, commercial ‘fishing’, which is basically strip-mining the ocean, is ruining our oceans.

Don’t want to ruin the oceans? Go vegan.

Don’t like the environmental problems of the soy industry? Go vegan.

Don’t like monoculture? Go vegan.

Don’t like the environmental problems of the petroleum industry? Go vegan.

Don’t like greenhouse gas emission? Go vegan.

Don’t like animal exploitation and cruelty? Go vegan.

Want environmental sustainability? Go vegan.

Want to feed the hungry? Go vegan.

Want to save water? Go vegan.

Want to cut air and water pollution? Go vegan.

Want to slow global warming? Go vegan.

Want to reduce the risk of heart attacks, strokes, diabetes, obesity, and cancer? Go vegan.

Animal agriculture is a deplorable hell that combines depraved savagery toward innocent beings with greed and reckless, anti-social irresponsibility toward the environment. And it's not just Smithfield and similar corporations, it is every single individual consumer of their products who personally shares in this violence and irresponsibility.

There is absolutely no single personal change that the average person can make that has a better impact on the environment than going vegan.

Rational Ignorance and Rational Irrationality

Introduction

Why is it that so many otherwise informed, intelligent, rational people are uninformed and epistemically irrational when it comes to their knowledge and beliefs about human-nonhuman relations, veganism, and animal rights? Why aren’t otherwise informed people knowledgeable about the atrocities in animal agriculture and other areas of animal use? Why do animal rights advocates hear so many absurd and implausible objections to animal rights and veganism? Why are the best arguments against animal rights, put forth by professional philosophers, merely classic examples of confirmed prejudice and tortured logic? [1]

I believe a good explanation can be found in two ideas generated in the field of economics during the past 60 years: rational ignorance and rational irrationality. There are several sources of information on these two ideas, but the primary resource I’ve used for this essay is “Why People Are Irrational about Politics” by Michael Huemer, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. For those who are interested, another interesting paper on the topic is “Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality” by Bryan Caplan, 2001. The purpose of this essay is to introduce these two ideas and apply them specifically to objections to veganism and animal rights. [2]

The Prevalence of Disagreement

Professor Huemer starts out his paper on the topic noting that political disagreement (and moral and religious disagreement) is very widespread, strong, and persistent. That is, any randomly-chosen two people are likely to disagree about many issues; they are likely to be very confident that they are right; and long discussions or rational argument is unlikely to bring them to agreement.

Why don’t we have such widespread, strong, and persistent disagreements in subjects like mathematics or science? While there are disagreements in these other subjects, the frequency, intensity of conviction, and tenacity do not compare to politics, morality, and religion. After this brief introduction, Professor Huemer considers four theories [2] of why there is so much strong and persistent disagreement in politics, and concludes that while there are several reasons for it, the most important factor is “rational irrationality” where “rationality” in the first term is referring to instrumental rationality (i.e. the “means-ends” or purely self-interested kind of rationality that economists refer to) and “rationality” in the second term is referring to epistemic rationality (i.e. the disinterested kind of rationality that seeks only truth, regardless of the implications of the truth).

Rational Ignorance

The economic theory of rational ignorance holds that people often rationally choose to remain ignorant of a topic because the perceived utility value of the knowledge is low or even negative. For an example of where perceived utility value is low, consider what you will gain from going through the time and trouble of knowing the specific voting records of all the politicians who represent you. You won't gain much. The fact is that the next politician elected will be the person who the other tens or hundreds of thousands of voters in your district voted for.

For an example where the perceived utility value is negative, consider what you will gain from knowing exactly what happened to the chickens who laid the eggs you purchased or were slaughtered for lunch today. If you have a conscience, it will likely ruin the meal for you, and may affect the way you see your eating habits in general. In the instrumental, purely self-interested sense of the word “rational”, it is irrational to want to know what happened to the sentient beings who were tortured and slaughtered for your next meal.

This explains why vegans, when we start to gently introduce the plight of ‘food’ animals to non-vegans, so often get a response along the lines of “Stop, I don’t want to know”. It’s not that we’re about to bore our non-vegan associate with the voting records of a dozen politicians (a perceived low utility value), it’s that the non-vegan is insisting on maintaining (instrumental, self-interested) rational ignorance in the face of highly disturbing information that bears heavily on certain decisions we make about three times a day (perceived negative utility value).

Rational Irrationality

Similarly, the economic theory of rational irrationality holds that it is often rational, in a purely self-interested, economic sense, to adopt epistemically irrational beliefs because the cost of epistemically rational beliefs exceeds the benefits of adopting them. So if I accept epistemically irrational beliefs against animal rights – for example, that sentient nonhumans don’t feel pain or that their pain doesn’t matter as much as human pain “because they’re not human” or that we’ll be overrun by billions of cows, pigs, and chickens if we stop slaughtering them – I bear none of the cost of accepting such absurd beliefs.

Rational irrationality makes two assumptions: 1) that individuals have, as Huemer puts it “. . .non-epistemic belief preferences (otherwise known as ‘biases’). That is, there are certain things people want to believe, for reasons independent of the truth of those propositions or how well they are supported by the evidence.”; and 2) that individuals exercise some control over their beliefs. Quoting Huemer again, “Given the first assumption, there is a “cost” to thinking rationally—namely, that one may not get to believe the things one wants to believe. Given the second assumption (and given that individuals are usually instrumentally rational), most people will accept this cost only if they receive greater benefits from thinking rationally.” Since individuals don’t perceive any personal benefit from being epistemically rational about animal rights and veganism, we can predict that they will often choose to be epistemically irrational about animal rights and veganism. (Huemer draws this conclusion regarding only political issues generally.)

Huemer points out that some people will highly value epistemic rationality itself, and therefore will be epistemically rational about political issues (and in our case here, animal rights and veganism). But there’s no reason to think everyone (or even most people) will have this value preference.

Non-epistemic Belief Preferences (i.e. Biases)

So what are some of the specific sources of non-epistemic belief preferences (biases and prejudices)? Huemer suggests four, although qualifies the suggestions by noting that a comprehensive answer would require extensive psychological study. I will significantly modify the details of Huemer’s suggestions to apply them to animal rights and veganism.

Self-Interested Bias

Due in large part to persistent marketing by the food industry, the confused message of new welfarists, and the anti-animal rights countermovement, most people falsely perceive veganism as ‘difficult’ at best, and at worst, hold a caricature of veganism as a diet consisting of ‘rabbit food’ (with mental images of barely surviving on things like iceberg lettuce, cucumbers, and carrots). Regardless of how delightful vegan food really is, and how much vegan junk food there is, and how many substitutes there are these days for our formerly favorite animal products, it is ultimately the perception of ‘difficulty’ that represents a ‘cost’ of going vegan. Of course, the greater the perception of ‘difficulty’ is; the greater is the perceived ‘cost’. And the greater the perceived ‘cost’ is; the greater is the likelihood of rational ignorance and rational irrationality.

Beliefs as Tools of Social Bonding

Most people want to go along with the beliefs of people who they like and associate with on a regular basis. Although veganism is becoming increasingly more common and widely accepted in most social groups, many people are afraid of the social consequences of becoming a vegan. They may fear being challenged or even ridiculed about their decision. They may fear awkward social situations or the loss of friends. These fears of social consequences (regardless of whether they are justified or not) can be powerful motivations for rational ignorance and rational irrationality regarding veganism and animal rights.

Beliefs as Self-Image Constructors

People generally want to adopt beliefs that support the self-image they want to maintain and project. If animal rights and veganism doesn’t fit the preconceived self-image for whatever reason, then rational ignorance and rational irrationality about animal rights and veganism are likely to occur.

Coherence Bias

People usually prefer to hold beliefs that fit well with their other beliefs. Someone who believes X as an evaluative proposition will likely be biased in favor of descriptive propositions or other evaluative propositions that support X. This tendency to prefer coherence can be either epistemically rational (unbiased) or irrational (biased). For example, one will prefer an epistemically rational (unbiased) coherence when one is genuinely and disinterestedly seeking epistemically sound beliefs. Contrarily, one will often prefer an epistemically irrational (biased) coherence when one is seeking ways of ‘justifying’ a self-serving belief by adopting erroneous premises that fit a self-serving (but epistemically false) conclusion.

Coherence bias is, by far, the most interesting bias in the case of animal rights and veganism and deserves its own essay. Why? Because arguably, the most wildly incoherent set of beliefs in our society is most people’s beliefs regarding sentient nonhuman beings. Further, people go to great lengths in rational ignorance and rational irrationality to cover up this incoherence born of bias.

Consider that so many of us love and coddle the family dog, or even a stranger’s dog (familiarity with the dog generally doesn’t matter) and then stick a fork in the equally sentient tortured chicken or drink the milk of the raped and slaughtered cow, who lost her calf to the veal industry. This is a classic example of an incoherence of evaluative beliefs that is wildly irrational epistemically. How do we cope with this epistemic incoherence that we’d normally scoff at? We cope with it via rational ignorance (“Stop, I don’t want to know what happens to the (‘food’) animals”) and rational irrationality (“They’re bred for food.” “What would happen to the millions of cows if we didn’t milk and slaughter them?” [and dozens of other epistemically irrational objections]).

Non-epistemic Belief Preferences Supported by Mechanisms of Belief Fixation

Huemer suggests that perhaps we cannot believe obviously false propositions at will, but we can still manage to exercise substantial control over our political beliefs (and in our case, resistance to veganism and animal rights). He suggests a few mechanisms by which we exercise such control.

Biased Weighting of Evidence

If we attribute slightly more weight to pieces of evidence supporting our preferred beliefs and slightly less weight to pieces of evidence against our preferred beliefs, the cumulative effect of these small biases in weighting evidence can be substantial.

Selective Attention and ‘Rationalization’

We tend to pay more attention to our beliefs and the ideas supporting them than we do to alternative beliefs. Also, as I discussed in the essay Understanding the Anti-Animal Rights Viewpoint, we tend to look to non-epistemically preferred beliefs as a conclusion and work backwards to find ‘premises’, ‘reasons’, or ‘rationalizations’ for the conclusion. When we encounter evidence supporting our non-epistemically preferred conclusion, we tend to accept it at face value. When we encounter evidence against our preferred conclusion, we tend to scrutinize it for what is ‘wrong’. Rational ignorance and rational irrationality are often the result.

We also tend to read and interact with sources we already agree with, and these sources are a steady stream of ‘evidence’ supporting our non-epistemic preferred beliefs. Indeed, one of the common complaints heard among people who are genuinely looking for solutions to society’s problems is that most people are buried in information they already agree with. So there is plenty of dialogue, but the vast majority of it is clustered within specific causes with very little productive dialogue with ‘outsiders’. And it’s not just those concerned with a specific cause who contribute to this isolated bubble effect, but the ‘outsiders’ are generally indifferent and often involved in their own isolated bubble.

Intelligence and Belief Fixation

One might think a high degree of intelligence or education would protect a person from holding on to false beliefs, but this is not necessarily the case. As Huemer points out, the highly intelligent or highly educated person often uses her or his intelligence or education as tools to find more support for non-epistemically preferred beliefs. Where a less intelligent or educated person might give up and admit error, the highly intelligent or educated person has more drive and resources to prop up false beliefs.

The relationship of intelligence and bias to finding out the truth of a matter are as follows: 1) high intelligence and low bias yield the best prospects at obtaining truth; 2) low intelligence and low bias yield good prospects at obtaining truth; 3) low intelligence and high bias yield poor prospects at obtaining truth; and 4) high intelligence and high bias yield the worst prospects at obtaining truth.

Irrationality Is a Big Problem

As Huemer concludes about irrationality regarding politics, so I conclude about irrationality regarding veganism and animals rights. That is, irrationality is the greatest problem we face. It is the greatest problem because it prevents us from solving other problems. It is analogous to an immune-deficiency disorder in health, where our methods of overcoming disease are diseased themselves. Rational ignorance and rational irrationality are widespread diseases of clear thinking and problem solving.

What Can We Do About It?

Like many problems and diseases, the first step to overcoming them is to recognize or admit that the problem exists, both in us and in others. Once we diagnose the problem, we can look for likely causes. We can ask ourselves what ulterior motives we have, or someone else has, for believing a certain claim. We can explore the beliefs underlying preferred beliefs to see what instrumental (self-interested) and epistemic (disinterested) reasons we have for believing what we believe.

Are there any biases from self-interest? For example, do we refuse to think rationally about veganism and animal rights because of preconceptions of what it might be like for us to be vegan? Do we believe something to reaffirm our desired self-image or to fit in with a social group? For example, do we refuse to think rationally about veganism because of a lack of self-esteem or fear of rejection? What do we really have to fear personally or socially – anything? Do we believe underlying claims because they are true or because they cohere well with other claims we want to believe? For example, do we accept irrational beliefs about nonhuman beings and their interests in not being exploited, tortured, and killed because they cohere well with our continued consumption of them and their reproductive products?

We can also make an effort to develop good thinking habits. We should hear or carefully consider both sides of an argument before accepting either side. We should become familiar with informal logic and common fallacies. When we feel inclined to assert a claim, we can ask what epistemic reasons we have for believing it, and also why we might want to believe the claim (independent of its truth). We should develop a higher degree of skepticism toward the beliefs that we suspect have ulterior motives, regardless of whether those ulterior motives are our own or someone else’s. Our first assumption, especially if there is an ulterior motive, such as profit or any conflict of interest, should be that the information provided to us is false, misleading, or incomplete, until we’ve subjected it to further scrutiny and verification. Such skepticism should not be merely applied to positive assertions, i.e. “X is true”, but also to negative assertions, i.e. “X is false” (in other words, proper skepticism is not just about avoiding erroneous acceptance, but equally about avoiding erroneous rejection).

Most of all, we should eliminate our ignorance about animal agriculture and be epistemically rational about it. We should face the facts with courage. Animal agriculture, regardless of what label it is marketed under (e.g. "free-range" or "humane certified"), is a deplorable business and we should know what we’re contributing to. Upon obtaining the facts about animal agriculture, we should beware of epistemically irrational attempts to ‘justify’ our participation in it. We should examine the issue impartially, with a particular effort to recognize our underlying motivations, if any, for accepting or rejecting certain descriptive or evaluative claims.

In the end, we should dispel ignorance; cultivate epistemic rationality; and go vegan as a result.

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Notes:

[1] For example: Carl Cohen’s “of-a-kind” argument is probably the strongest of an incredibly weak collection of arguments manufactured to attempt to ‘justify’ severe animal exploitation, but it is nothing more than confirmed prejudice (“yes, I’m a speciesist”) and a question-begging fallacy (Cohen’s “of-a-kind” premise does not logically connect to his conclusion that species is relevant; it merely begs the question by assuming species is relevant as a dogmatic ‘given’. If Cohen insists that he’s not assuming species, but only conceptual rationality, is relevant, then he must maintain that it’s morally permissible to force painful and lethal experiments on mentally-challenged humans. Logically, he cannot have it both ways.) Further, and most importantly, Cohen never establishes why possessing conceptual-symbolic rationality (as opposed to mere sentience and perceptual intelligence) would be necessary to an interest in one’s own well-being in the first place.

[2] In writing this essay, I have relied heavily on Professor Huemer’s paper since it effectively applies rational ignorance and rational irrationality, as well as many of their causes, to political disagreements in general; disagreement in animal rights and veganism being subsets of general moral and political disagreement. That said, I have also substantially ignored, diverged from, and added to sections of Huemer’s paper, so this essay should not at all be taken as representative of Huemer’s paper, and if one is interested in his paper, I encourage opening the link in the introduction to this essay and reading it.

Veganism as a Minimum Standard of Decency

In discussions with non-vegans – particularly non-vegans on the Internet who are familiar with the assertions of both the vegan animal rights movement and the assertions of the countermovement – the issue of “drawing the line” is often raised as a sort of objection to veganism. While it’s true that vegans avoid a lot of harm, so the argument goes, vegans also indirectly cause a lot of harm: animals are killed by crop harvesters and motor vehicles; natural and artificial pesticides are used in crop production; and often one cannot tell exactly what harm might have been done either to animals directly or to the environment in any given purchase, even at the local natural foods store or farmers’ market. Since vegans haven’t achieved perfection of purity in the art of non-harming and non-violence, it is really only a matter of line-drawing, and until one achieves absolute perfection of purity, one has no business criticizing any other lines that might be drawn. To criticize other lines is to fail to recognize one’s own shortcomings from Platonic perfection, and therefore to fall into – dare we say it – ‘hypocrisy’.

Drawing lines can be difficult in any area of morality, and the more precise the line drawn, often the more difficulties that arise. However, the difficulty of drawing precise lines should not deter us from exploring less precise lines of minimum standards or moral baselines that are (or should be) reasonable for the vast majority of people in society, even if it would require a complete abolition of animal agriculture.

We establish and philosophically defend moral baselines regularly in society in the form of laws regarding such issues as murder, involuntary manslaughter, assault, declarations of war, and speed limits, even though these issues can be just as difficult to draw lines in as animal issues. None of us are “pure” when it comes to protecting humans from cruelty and death either; yet we do draw lines: we aren’t cannibals; and most of us don’t knowingly or happily support human enslavement and slaughter. [1]

We ought also to establish and philosophically defend such baselines regarding animals. Instead, we have a morally relative (and wrong) laissez-faire policy of refusing to even discuss line-drawing regarding animals, despite their overwhelming similarities to us in terms of the morally relevant characteristics: sentience and perceptual intelligence and awareness.

Given the morally relevant similarities and irrelevant differences between humans and other animals, and given that we are likely to find absolute perfection in non-harming far too ascetic or practically impossible in our modern society, veganism is the baseline we ought to promote and live by. Veganism is not the end point or the most we can do; rather, it is the least we can do.

Veganism is essentially refraining from contributing to the exploitation and intentional killing or slaughter of nonhuman beings. Preventing accidental and incidental human fatalities in traffic accidents and police action – even foreseen human deaths – is not required by laws prohibiting slavery and murder. In the same way, preventing accidental and incidental deaths in traffic accidents or harvesting crops – even foreseen deaths – is not required by veganism. In other words, abolitionist animal rights, as currently conceived, and the corresponding moral baseline of veganism are precisely the same in “line-drawing” as laws prohibiting chattel slavery and murder. Laws prohibiting slavery and murder say nothing about preventing motor vehicle injuries and fatalities, or how much cost we should incur in saving an injured child’s life, or “friendly fire” (unintended killing) in a justified war of self-defense. We should certainly take appropriate measures to reduce such deaths as much as possible, but again, veganism is merely a first and minimum standard, not the final or the best standard.

Choosing to consume animal products is a choice to partake in the exploitation and intentional slaughter of sentient beings. Given our wide variety of food choices today, we can easily refuse to partake in such exploitation and slaughter. In many cases, such as this one, drawing lines can be very appropriate and strongly defended, especially when one acknowledges that the line drawn is only a minimum standard of decency, not a maximum standard of purity.
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Notes:

[1] If you live and pay taxes in an industrialized nation with a strong military, such as the United States, you inadvertently and indirectly, and hopefully unwillingly and regrettably, support the slaughter of innocent humans in the form of warfare in other countries (waged primarily for economic reasons; the economic reasons controversially thought to be also ‘national security’ reasons) and arms supply to violent militias, just like vegans inadvertently, unwillingly, and regrettably support the slaughter of innocent nonhumans by living and paying taxes in our animal-exploiting society.

[2] I have edited this essay as of July 9, 2009 to remove two references to Jainism as suggesting an ascetic standard of non-violence. It was my previous understanding that many or most followers of Jainism went to ascetic lengths to avoid harming. I have since learned that this is not the case, and that, although veganism is increasing among followers of the religion, many are not vegans, much less practitioners of an ascetic form of non-violence.

Gentleness, Kindness, In-Groups, and Out-Groups

A few months ago, I had a discussion with a guy – I’ll call him “Steve” – who argued that there was nothing wrong with intentionally slaughtering animals for food. He characterized himself as a very gentle person, a “writer and a healer”. He also characterized his non-vegan friends and associates as very kind, gentle, and empathetic people. His implied point was essentially that slaughtering animals for food is one of the things good, kind, and gentle people do, and because such wonderfully kind and sensitive people do this, there couldn’t be anything morally wrong with it. If there was something morally wrong with it, such kind and gentle people wouldn’t do it, so the "reasoning" went.

I had no reason to doubt that Steve and his associates were “very kind and gentle” people (to humans and companion animals). Indeed, I have met many very kind and gentle people who are averse to violence, and many of them are perfectly fine with slaughtering animals. So how do we explain the apparent contradiction? How do such kind and gentle people ignore the violence on their plate? Are they merely not aware of it?

That may be part or most of the answer for some of them, but not Steve. Steve happened to be very knowledgeable. This was not Steve’s first encounter with a guy like me. In fact, Steve told me that he was a vegetarian at one point in his life, and judging by his replies in the discussion, I believe Steve probably knew as much about the workings of slaughterhouses and “free-range” and “organic” operations as I do.

I believe the answer to this contradiction can be found in the historical observation of human behavior and attitudes toward “in-groups” and “out-groups”, where the line dividing members of a more powerful in-group from a less powerful out-group is based on some morally irrelevant difference, such as race, sex, ethnicity, or species.

Rather than recognizing and accepting the morally relevant similarities, such as important interests of the out-group in not being exploited or intentionally killed by an indifferent in-group, the in-group ignores the similarities and exaggerates the morally irrelevant differences (such as race, sex, ethnicity, species). When an advocate of the out-group points out the irrelevance of the differences, the defenders of the in-group merely re-state their prejudice: “But they’re not white” or “ But they’re not human”.

The difference in treatment of the members of in-groups and out-groups by the more powerful in-group is often stark and shocking to one who doesn’t hold the in-group’s prejudice. Members of the in-group are held in the highest esteem and are treated with the utmost care and hospitality, kindness and gentleness. Indeed, in-groups members, especially those in whom the prejudice is deepest, often coddle fellow in-group members with a fantastic spectacle of love and affection. Meanwhile, the indifference toward out-group members often results in the harshest cruelty inflicted by the very same individuals who are so kind, gentle, and loving toward in-group members. In fact, the kindness and consideration shown to in-group members almost seems a kind of compensation or cover-up for the indifference and cruelty shown out-group members.

Numerous historical examples bring this point home. The gracious hospitality, good humor, and good cheer shown to each other among in-group plantation and slave owners in the antebellum American South stood in harsh contrast to the indifference toward the plight of the owned, out-group slaves. With almost any oppressive group or regime one can think of in history – from genocidal regimes to slave societies – the treatment of in-group members is no way to monitor the indifference and often extreme cruelty toward out-group members. Again, I have no reason to doubt that Steve and his associates are “very kind and gentle people” to humans and companion animal in-group members, but that is no way to monitor their indifference and resultant (acts or toleration of) cruelty toward the exploited animal out-group.

Our present society’s out-group, first and foremost, is sentient nonhuman beings, and we are no different from any other powerful and oppressive in-group in our prejudice and indifference and the extreme cruelty that results from it, but many of us fail to see it.

It is not enough, however, to merely see our prejudice. If we are to overcome our prejudice, we must at least recognize and live by a minimum standard of moral behavior, which in the case of sentient nonhumans, is veganism. Going vegan is not the most we can do, but the least we can do.

Recommendations on Animal Rights Books Published in 2008

Animals As Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation

Gary Francione
Columbia University Press, 2008

If the right of animals to not be exploited, intentionally killed, and used as property is ever taken seriously by future generations, Professor Gary Francione will very likely be seen as the most important thinker to write on the topic. Gary Francione’s ideas are indispensible if animal rights or any meaningful protection of animals is ever to come about. There are various reasons why this judgment is not widely shared today in our society. First and foremost of those reasons are the deep cultural prejudice, anthropocentrism, and speciesism of society-at-large, including prejudices within the so-called animal “rights” movement. Professor Francione is an iconoclast who employs careful reasoning from moral principles that most of us already accept to destroy the prejudice and dogma infecting our thoughts, habits, and behavior as they impact sentient nonhuman beings. A second reason that Francione’s ideas are not widely accepted, closely related to the first, is that there is very little money to be made by nonprofit animal organizations in vegan education; but there is plenty of money to be made in what Francione criticizes: welfare reform efforts or, as welfarists like to call it, “picking the low hanging fruit”.

Animals As Persons is made up of seven essays that collectively provide an excellent summary of Professor Francione’s thought. The first essay introduces the reader to his abolitionist theory. The second essay is a response to various critics who deny that the property status of animals is an insurmountable problem. The third essay is on how the “similar minds” approach to assessing the moral importance of animal suffering is inadequate. The fourth essay is a reply to Professor Cass Sunstein’s critique of Professor Francione’s book, Introduction to Animal Rights. The fifth essay discusses the two questions of empirical necessity and moral justification regarding the use of animals in biomedical research. The sixth essay explains why the feminist ethic of care does not provide protection that extends beyond rights and how it is merely another form of new welfarist theory which, like Peter Singer’s theory, seeks to provide greater weight to the interests of nonhumans while retaining the hierarchy of humans. The final essay critiques Professor Emeritus Tom Regan’s “lifeboat scenario” and points out how it is more of a problem for Regan’s theory of animal rights than Francione originally thought.

Whether you’re new to Gary Francione’s thought or very familiar with it, I highly recommend this book. It includes enough of the basics in accessible language to be a good introduction to someone new to the topics, while adding sufficient new material that has not been widely published previously for those already familiar with his work to profit from reading it.

Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship

Gary Steiner
Columbia University Press, 2008

Animals and the Moral Community takes up two major topics in six chapters. The first three chapters, drawing on previous works of philosophy and cognitive ethology, take the reader on a superb tour and analysis of both historical and current thought on the mental life of animals, settling on a moderate and compelling theory of animal minds that avoids the attribution to animals of complex and abstract cognition (i.e. conceptual rationality) found in normal adult humans and avoids the ludicrous neo-Cartesian denial of perceptual intelligence and experiential awareness. Bringing out the important difference between perceptual intelligence and conceptual rationality, Professor Steiner states at the end of these chapters on animal minds, “Animals are intelligent creatures with subjective states of awareness. The more we come to appreciate this fact, the less we will be able to cling to a related anthropocentric prejudice, namely, that animals, being cognitively inferior to humans, are morally inferior as well.” (p. 88) This leads us to the second major topic of the book: moral status and kinship.

In discussing the moral status of and our kinship with animals, Steiner explores the conflict between liberal individualism and animal rights. As it has been traditionally conceived, liberal individualism posits Kantian rational autonomy of the moral agent as a necessary criterion for inclusion in the moral community. As such, many thinkers today who uncritically accept this traditional conception of liberal individualism, but nevertheless realize that the degree and severity of our exploitation of animals is morally unacceptable, have sought to argue that animals have sufficient cognitive abilities (i.e. minds sufficiently similar to human minds) to be included in a moral community that espouses traditional liberal individualism. Their opponents, of course, have denied such cognitive ability, but neither side has come to question the legitimacy of positing Kantian rational autonomy as a necessary criterion in the first place.

Drawing on Gary Francione’s rejection of what Francione calls “similar minds theory”, Professor Steiner also rejects the notion that the moral status of animals is a function of how similar animal minds are to human minds. Rather, the morally relevant criterion is sentience. Specifically, Steiner’s view “is that perceptual experience (as defined in chapter 3) is sufficient, although perhaps not necessary, for moral status.”

So how are we to overcome the existing paradigm of liberal individualism as traditionally conceived and its anthropocentric emphasis on Kantian rational autonomy and the exclusive liberty of the Kantian rational agent? The remaining two chapters of the book are dedicated to answering this question.

Gary Steiner introduces us to a broader and more logically consistent and holistic conception of justice that goes beyond the narrow confines of social justice with its emphasis on agency and reciprocity to what he calls “cosmic justice” in the context of what he describes as “cosmic holism”, which recognizes our similarities and kinship with other sentient beings. It is our common striving for life and well-being that brings humans and nonhumans together in kinship. Our rationality allows us to recognize this kinship and compels us to respect the mutual striving and struggle for well-being and modify our attitudes and behavior accordingly; in particular, our rationality ultimately compels us to go and stay vegan.

The careful and thorough analysis of the nature of sentient nonhuman beings and the relation of that nature to a clear and detailed explanation of a conception of justice that is far more logically consistent and holistic than that found in traditional liberal individualism makes this book a must-read for both experts and those new to animal rights.

On the Strengths and Limitations of Alliance Politics

Introduction

A common complaint made by some progressive thinkers is that justice activists are far too splintered and/or obsessed with a single progressive issue, such as ecology, human rights, or animal rights. The complaint is that “single issue activists” fail to see the common ground of opposing unjust or unsustainable exploitation among the various single causes and often blindly oppose each other instead of cooperating. This failure to understand the common denominator and corresponding failure to cooperate undermines the efforts of everyone seeking justice and sustainability. The answer is alliance politics, where we build bridges and connections among the various single issues, and become stronger collectively and individually as a result.

My purpose in this essay will be to analyze the call for alliance politics and set forth what I see as its strengths and limitations. I will argue for a middle ground between what I see as two extremes. One extreme being that of pure single issue politics whereby one sees only the differences between the various issues (ecology, animal rights, human rights and egalitarianism, economic fairness and opportunity) and scoffs at or ignores one, some, or all other justice issues. The other extreme being that of pure alliance politics whereby one sees only the similarities among the various issues and fails to see important differences and why others might choose to focus exclusively, and even “obsessively”, on one issue.

The Common Ground: The Strength of and Reasons for Alliance Politics

The common ground of all progressive movements is their opposition to some form of unjust or unsustainable exploitation perpetuated by excessive self-interest, myopic views, and/or a general herd mentality. Whether the issue is speciesism, slavery, racism, sexism, heterosexism, or eco-destruction, there is always an exploiter or an oppressor, sometimes including the vast majority of society, who ignores the interests of a certain “other” in favor of some irrational prejudice (e.g. hate or intentional indifference) or self-serving benefit derived from the exploitive or oppressive behavior and attitude. This common ground is the substance underlying all justice movements.

Because of this common ground, anytime a “progressive” person or group espousing one such cause (e.g. ecology or gay rights) trivializes or intentionally ignores another cause (e.g. anti-speciesism or economic opportunity), that person or group undermines the underlying substance of his or her own cause by arbitrarily (and often unwittingly) endorsing exploitation or oppression which is merely in different form.

By recognizing the underlying substance – the injustice at the root of what progressive movements are opposed to – we can unite at least to the extent of recognizing each single issue’s “baseline” or “minimum standards” of behavior and attitudes. While attempts to maximize any given single issue’s goals may well intrude on another single issue’s baseline, I cannot think of one case where any single issue’s baseline intrudes on any other single issue’s baseline. Of course, one might object that it depends on how one defines a baseline, but using the most commonly promoted baselines as definitions, it’s unlikely that any of them would conflict. [1] In fact, not only is it unlikely that baselines would conflict, but most baselines are mutually beneficial. For example, veganism, which is the baseline for the animal rights movement, would do wonders for ecology if adopted by the vast majority of the world’s human population. In the next section of this essay, we’ll get into some of the conflicts that arise when we try to maximize the goals of any given single issue, but there can and should be general agreement and support among progressives in the commonly promoted baselines of single issues.

The Differences: The Limitations of Alliance Politics

While there is much common ground among the various movements fighting unjust or unsustainable exploitation and we can and certainly should respect other movements’ baselines by not violating those baselines, there are also important differences – both in the causes themselves and the people who dedicate themselves to a cause – that might motivate some of us to focus solely on one issue and avoid involvement in actively promoting another (while not violating the baselines of the other movements). [2]

Differences Between the Issues Themselves

For example, the ethical grounds of protecting the environment are significantly different from the morality of protecting the important interests of individual sentient beings. In the case of protecting the environment, our obligation is not directly to the environment (water, air, minerals, and species), but directly to current and future generations of individual sentient beings (human and nonhuman). Our obligations to protect local and global eco-systems are indirect duties. The nature of this indirect obligation is that it is not wrong to exploit the environment per se, or use it solely as a means to our ends, but to use it sustainably so that future generations of individual sentient beings can survive and thrive in the same environment years, decades, and centuries from now. If we fail to make significant changes in our use of the environment, there may be no environment in which our great grandchildren can possibly survive, much less thrive.

In contrast, our obligations toward sentient beings (including sentient nonhumans) are direct obligations to individual beings to not exploit or use them solely as a means to our ends, but to respect and treat them as ends in themselves. Our current use and treatment of animals is deplorable beyond the ability of language to articulate it. It is simply the worst atrocity humanity has ever engaged in as a species.

The contrast in the respective moral grounds of each justice movement and the differences in the problems they face make them specialized enough to call for specialized and highly-focused movements, organizations, and individuals to tackle them.

Differences Between Activists as Individuals

There are also differences in the personalities and life experiences of individual advocates of various issues that motivate one to fight a particular injustice. Having a strong personal experience of a particular event or situation can often be the catalyst for dedicating one’s life to a certain issue. Being an individual who has experienced injustice personally can motivate lifetime dedication to a movement. Having a previous expertise in a given area can also lead to involvement with a particular movement.

When we combine the differences in the various forms of oppression or exploitation with the differences in the individuals who choose to fight a particular injustice, it is no wonder that people will gravitate toward one or another movement.

Even within a given movement, one might be motivated to focus on a single issue within the movement due to expertise or life experiences. This is fine with the caveat that one does not ignore or refuse to acknowledge a vital root connected with the larger movement, as I discussed in the essay entitled, Picking the Low Hanging Fruit: What Is Wrong with Single Issue Campaigns?. For example, animal activists concerned about whales, seals, or fur cannot profitably ignore the fact that the underlying foundation of those abuses is the fact that so few people in our society are vegans (with the moral reasons implied in the term "vegan").

Conflicts Between Movements: Maximizing the Interest of One Movement May Violate the Baseline of Another

There’s a difference between achieving an acceptable baseline and maximizing the interests of any given movement. A good example of this is when environmentalists attempt to maximize the health of an ecosystem by violating the individual rights of animals living in such an environment. The best way to maximize the health of any specific ecosystem is to free it from human interference. But too often, humans create a problem via interference, then seek to “cure” the problem we created by further interference. The “cure” often includes intentionally killing innocent inhabitants when there’s an alternative that avoids such intentional killing. Further, our “cure” often leads to more intractable problems in the pulled-string-that-never-ends. We don’t “cull” the human herd to maximize ecosystems (or even to meet acceptable ecological baselines), and we should not “cull” other species for the same reason: it’s a violation of an individual’s right to his or her life. Bad things happen in life, but we don’t need to add to it with the arrogance of “managing” nature.

We need to accept trade-offs when it comes to attempting to maximize the interest of a given movement. We need to be creative and look for alternatives rather than to simplistic solutions that override the rights of others. Dilemmas may arise, but we should not manufacture false dilemmas or ignore viable alternatives because we scoff at or fail to take seriously the baseline of another justice movement.

Conclusion: Respecting the Common Ground and Acknowledging the Differences

Respecting the common ground of the substance of exploitation or oppression per se to all justice issues is important. When we don’t respect that common ground in any given movement (e.g. animal rights), we invariably undermine the foundation of our own claims about fighting injustice elsewhere. Respecting the common ground necessarily means taking seriously and behaving in accordance with other movements’ baselines or minimum standards.

On the other hand, we don’t need to be an activist for every, or even any, given cause. As long as we’re blameless – which is to say as long as we’re not violating baselines or intentionally engaging in injustice or unnecessary harm ourselves – we should pick our causes and issues as we desire and enjoy involvement in them. And if activism isn’t our thing, but we’re not contributing to a movement’s problem in any significant way, that’s fine too.

On that note, go vegan.

____________________
Notes:

[1] The “commonly promoted baselines” I’m referring to essentially means one is not participating, in any meaningful sense, in the harm or injustice that caused the single issue movement to arise in the first place. It is the mission of the single issue movement to eliminate such harm or injustice from society. Examples include: 1) Avoiding racism, sexism, and heterosexism by treating people of different ethnic, racial, sex, or sexual preference groups fairly and equally to our own; 2) Avoiding slavery (or forms of it) by avoiding sweatshop products (clothing, etc.); 3) Avoiding speciesism by being a vegan, leaving animals alone (except to help them in certain human-created situations) and not participating or contributing to the exploitation of animals; 4) Avoiding eco-destruction by living simply and taking steps to reduce our eco-footprints as much as reasonably possible, especially in the “big decisions”, such as how many offspring one produces or one’s choice of occupation.

[2] One might confuse or conflate what I’m saying here with what I said in the essay entitled “Picking the Low Hanging Fruit: What’s Wrong with Single Issue Campaigns?”. The difference is crucial. While unjust or unsustainable exploitation may be a common denominator among various otherwise diverse problems giving rise to various causes and movements, racism, sexism, eco-destruction, and animal rights are disparate enough problems to warrant highly specialized treatment by specialized movements, organizations, and individuals. Further, none of these single problems is the root, or completely overshadows, all of the others in importance by magnitude or nature whereby once we solve one of them, the others will follow virtually automatically.